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Abstract. 
The paper discusses the topical subject of network neutrality, from a US and European legal perspective. The article will 
begin by first defining network neutrality before addressing the underpinning technology and will then compare the legal 
approaches adopted by Europe and the U.S. In Europe, there is an existing electronic communications regulatory framework 
which can be used to address the network neutrality problem which renders any further legislation unnecessary and perhaps 
detrimental to the current framework. In the US, however, the main concern arising is a potential for a “fragmented” Internet, 
which leads us to conclude that network neutrality legislation is necessary on multiple levels. The article will conclude that 
the US stance on network neutrality legislation will cause a seismic shift in the way we view technology and the way that 
networks are accessed and utilised.
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1. Introduction
While network neutrality has been the subject of heated debate in the US, the topic has received far less global 
attention. In this paper, the authors explore network neutrality from a European and US standpoint, with particular 
focus on the international implications arising from the US stance on network neutrality legislation. 
The paper is divided into four sections. The first section will examine the notion of network neutrality as 
defined by Wu and Berners Lee and define the scope of “network neutrality” as it relates to this paper. The second 
and third sections will discuss the current European and US legal frameworks. The differences in network 
infrastructure are examined in light of the contrasting legal frameworks in the US and Europe. 
2. Network Neutrality 
In this paper, we use the term “network neutrality” to apply to the provision of Internet applications and services by 
Internet service providers (ISPs), in the context of wireless (cell-phones and PDAs) and wired communications.[1] 
Providers should be restricted from blocking services and software from end users. 
In addition, legislative measures are unduly cumbersome upon enforcement authorities such as the FCC and 
other telecommunication authorities which lack sufficient network-monitoring resources.
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US? Irrespective of whether this is also a European problem, networks are not confined by borders.[2]
Post-Print
32.1 Arguments Made for Legislation on US Network Neutrality
2.1.2. Consumer choice
The underlying rationale submitted by authors such as Wu and Lessig is that companies that restrict services deprive
or degrade consumers’ experiences and services. Wu argues that “blocking [services] can keep a better or cheaper 
product (VoIP) from coming to market at all, and often it can prevent such products from being offered in an 
effective form.” 
2.1.2. Public and private property
Broadband connections are a public resource and should be used to convey data irrespective of its origination. 
Consumers are entitled to resources on the Internet without interference from their broadband providers.
2.1.3. Privacy of Communications[3]
Communications privacy is an important issue for end-users, particularly if they want to be able to decide whether 
Internet services are blocked by their ISP. Any monitoring of web pages accessible by individuals should be limited 
to what is necessary and in accordance with the European Data Protection Framework (European Data Protection 
Directive 95/46/EC and Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications 2002/58/EC). Transparency is needed 
on the part of network operators if the privacy of users’ web browsing activities is to be maintained. 
3. E.U. Legal Framework
3.1. New Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications 
The EU regulatory framework is comprised of five main Directives.[4] The approach by the Directorate of 
Information Society is to take a liberal view to telecommunications such that it is left to the “undertaking” to 
negotiate interconnection agreements. 
The Interconnection Directive applies to networks carrying publicly available communications services,
including fixed and mobile telecommunications networks. It does not apply to web-based content,[5] but rather to 
ISPs.
The main provision to note is that which imposes a greater responsibility upon NRAs to ensure access and 
interconnectivity. Article 5 of the Directive delineates the powers and responsibilities of the NRAs concerning access 
and interconnection. This provision provides that NRAs shall ‘encourage and where appropriate ensure, in 
accordance with the provision of this Directive, adequate access and interconnection, and interoperability of services, 
exercising their responsibility in a way that promotes efficiency, sustainable competition, and gives maximum 
benefit to end-users’ (emphasis added).
If an operator is found to have SMP (at wholesale level),[6] then the NRA can, under the Interconnection and 
Access Directive, impose the following obligations:
 Transparency obligations (Art. 9)
 Non-discrimination obligations (Art. 10)
 Accounting separation obligations (Art. 11)
 Obligations requiring mandatory access to be granted to specific network facilities (Art. 12)
 Price control and cost accounting obligations (Art. 13)
Article 12 is relevant because NRAs can impose obligations on operators to meet reasonable requests for access to, 
and use of, specific network elements. 
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greater responsibility to ensure connectivity to end-users. It is interesting to note the emphasis placed under the 
Directive upon NRAs to ensure that consumers are not disadvantaged if access tiering should occur between network 
providers.
A further point to add is that unlike in the US, the broadband market in the UK[7] is such that consumers can 
easily switch from one network operator to another. In the latest report[8] published by Ofcom, approximately 69% of 
UK Internet users surveyed thought it would be easy to switch Internet service providers. This flexibility was further 
reinforced by rules regarding broadband migrations between different ISPs, introduced by Ofcom on 14 February 
2007[9]. All in all, it is unlikely that consumers would tolerate discrimination between service providers by their 
network operators.[10] 
Finally, it should be added that Regulation 2887/2000[11], stipulates that access can only be refused on the 
basis of technical infeasibility or the need to maintain network integrity. The Regulation also requires the incumbent 
operators to offer shared access[12] and sub-loop unbundling. 
At the time of writing, the European Commission has indicated (in its recent communication) that it will 
monitor legal developments of network neutrality in the US, yet whether anything will transpire on this front is still 
unclear. The prevailing view is that the existing European legislative framework is sufficient to deal with conflicts 
arising between network and cable providers, and therefore does not need to call for the types of regulations 
anticipated in the US. Despite this, whether the existing regulation will be sufficient to deal with overt discrimination 
between broadband providers and application providers is still unclear. 
3.2. UK: Communications Act 2003
The national regulatory authority in the UK, Ofcom, took the view that the existing regulatory framework does not 
necessitate further network neutrality regulation. 
The echoes from Ofcom highlight the concerns over reasons why further regulation is not considered 
necessary. The current EU and UK regulatory framework already provides for remedies against SMP network 
operators that charge for prioritising, blocking, or degrading traffic. Ofcom acknowledges that “network neutrality 
rules could be developed as an iteration of the existing non-discrimination rules.”
Market power is elaborated under sec. 79 of the Communications Act of 2003, whereby Ofcom would have 
to identify the markets and carry out an analysis, taking into account the guidelines by the European Commission.
Can the UK Communications Act 2003 guarantee user end-to-end connectivity? A useful example is to 
consider BT and Kingston, whereby its predecessor, Director of Oftel, has been able to impose obligations on BT 
and Kingston to provide network access on reasonable request to third parties and do so on fair and reasonable terms, 
conditions and charges by virtue of sec’s 151(3) and 151(4) Communications Act 2003.[13]
The most recent example whereby an NRA has been able to impose obligations on non-SMP operators 
under the corresponding national provision to Article 5(1) of Access and Interconnection Directive is the case 
UK/2003/19 in which Ofcom had notified an obligation on Sky Subscriber Services Limited, the only provider of 
access control services for digital TV, to provide access to these services on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory 
terms. 
To summarise the European and UK section, the existing regulations under the Communication Act 2003 
and the Access and Interconnection Directive means that that scenario of access tiering between network operators 
and application providers is remote. If access tiering were to occur, the NRAs have a responsibility to ensure end-to-
end connectivity for non-SMP operators under Art. 5(1) of the Access and Interconnection Directive or in the case of 
(wholesale) SMP operators, adhere to the obligations as provided under this Directive. 
4. U.S. Network Neutrality
The US debate hinges on the fear that broadband companies will support certain content based websites and not 
others, thereby influencing consumer actions. 
If Congress does not act accordingly and mandate network neutrality through national legislation, Internet 
integrity will be compromised as US states are likely to enact their own legislation, which may lead to a division on 
the network structure (due to interstate jurisdictional clashes). This is a realistic scenario given that in June 2007, 
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Given the scope of this paper, the subject of Internet segregation will not be explored here.
Consequently, broadband providers that favour one service provider over another may violate State network 
neutrality legislation, privacy law (on the local, state, and national levels),[15] and specific statutes passed by States 
and the Federal government to provide citizens with information access.
A counter-argument to the need for regulation is that consumers will transform their buying patterns such 
that the broadband providers will carry the content that the consumers desire. However, should economic welfare 
determine whether one can call 911, read about governmental legislation, or watch political debates? 
Unlike the past, national cable providers now tend to offer a full range of communications products, often 
bundled together. The question then is: How can a consumer migrate to a cost-effective broadband provider if such 
choices are limited or unavailable? And certainly, broadband carriers should block competitors who seek to deliver 
phone or cable services using their bandwidth. The technology precepts to execute broadband content discrimination 
potentially infringe upon the constitutional and federally recognized right to privacy for oral communications in the 
home.
Finally, the current network neutrality debate is not considering a very costly and real potential outcome. That is, 
if broadband discrimination is permitted and Congress does not ensure network neutrality, the mass exodus of 
website national cable providers from the US to more favourable (business-wise) countries is a possibility. 
4.1. Current US Framework on Network Neutrality
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the “1996 Act”)[16], is the first major legislation addressing 
telecommunications since the Communications Act of 1934 (the “1934 Act”) and was intended to address a new era 
in communications, and to serve as a framework for regulating emerging technologies and markets. 
Carriers selling broadband Internet access, pursuant to recent Supreme Court decisions, are considered 
information services carriers. It is here that the distinction between information services carriers and telecommunication 
services becomes significant, since the 1996 Act regulates telecommunications carriers while information service carriers 
do not fall under its purview. Traditionally distinct service providers, such as cable television and telephone service 
providers, now find themselves in direct competition. Not surprisingly, the Courts have played a significant role in these 
new conflicts.
The Supreme Court’s decision in National Cable & Telecommunications Association et al v Brand X Internet 
Services et al[17] (hereinafter “Brand X”) in June 2005 held that content and applications providers could no longer count 
on regulation to guarantee access to cable modem and DSL systems.[18]
The FCC’s ruling under the 1996 Act classified broadband cable modem service as an "information service" 
because Internet access was a capability for manipulating and storing information, but not a "telecommunications 
service," due to the integrated nature of such access and the high-speed wire used to provide it.[19] Thus, broadband cable 
modem service was not subject to mandatory Title II of the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064, as amended, 47 
US.C.S. § 151 et seq., common-carrier regulation. Within weeks, the Commission then ruled that DSL was also an 
information service.[20] Thanks to this reclassification, DSL carriers are no longer subject to the requirement that they 
share DSL lines with broadband competitors; the FCC required that carriers honor existing agreements for one year, 
which expired in August, 2006.[21] Collectively, these decisions re-ignited the network neutrality debate. 
4.2. Network Neutrality and Oral communications
The network neutrality debate focuses on whether last-mile providers are blocking access to content and 
applications. Network neutrality assures that telecommunication infrastructures remain “dumb,” delivering content 
and services equally in a “best-effort.” This best effort usually entails packets being delivered in a “first-in first-out” 
(FIFO) method at the maximum speed possible given network constraints. Under network neutrality, network 
operators do not decide what content users can access. Further, they cannot impede the flow or give preferential 
treatment to particular kinds of content. 
Leading broadband companies argue that they have not blocked access to content or applications and that 
market forces prevent them from doing so in the future.[22] This market argument is erroneous because broadband 
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creating a tiered Internet by granting preferential treatment to application and NCPs that compensate BSPs 
monetarily.[23]
So far, the current debate has lacked a discussion of privacy. Within the U.S, oral communications receive 
protection from the legislative and judicial branches. Since Katz v. United States,[24] courts have routinely forbidden 
third parties from tapping or monitoring oral communications. However, they just as routinely permit business to 
track, store and sell data packets transmitted in the same way with the implied or explicit consent of either party 
engaged in the transmission. The digital age and VoIP[25] have muddled the jurisdictional distinction between voice 
and data information.[26] With the convergence of oral and data into a single transmission medium, the Courts, like 
computers, are unable to distinguish between oral and data communications.[27]
The use of the VoIP and analogous technologies has made this legal distinction impossible to uphold 
because oral and data communications now travel over the same wires simultaneously in digital data packets.[28] 
The courts have found telephone communications protected from governmental privacy invasions in two 
principal ways. [29] First, parties to a voice conversation are entitled to a "reasonable expectation of privacy" under 
the Supreme Court opinion of Katz v. United States.[30] Secondly, the Federal Wiretap Act of 1968 prevents 
unauthorized third-party interceptions of telephone communications, save for two scenarios: 1) the interceptor is in 
possession of a court-mandated order or; 2) either of the involved parties in the communication have already 
provided consent.[31] The Katz opinion explains the rationale behind the Supreme Court's oft-quoted statement that 
the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,"[32] and concludes that an entity’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy must be protected from government searches. The Federal Wiretap Act was Congress’s response to the Katz
opinion and was an attempt to prevent electronic surveillance of oral telephone communications without a court 
order.[33]
Title III of the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (the "Wiretap Act")[34] initially afforded 
extensive protection to wire communications—oral communications were protected only when there were reasonable 
expectations of privacy.[35] Because the legislation covered both face-to-face oral communications and traditional 
point-to-point wired communications, courts were faced with myriad interpretive difficulties.[36] To correct the 
problems with Title III, Congress amended the Wiretap Act by passing the Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
of 1986 (ECPA).[37] Congress designed the ECPA to prohibit the intentional interception of oral, wire, and electronic 
communications.[38] Because Congress was concerned with advancements in electronic technology that would be 
capable of defeating any privacy expectations, the ECPA enacted a strict set of standards for the interception of oral, 
wire, and electronic communications.[39] Congress further expanded the protection of wireless communication by 
passing the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (CALEA), which extended Title III to the 
radio portions of cellular and cordless phones.[40]
While the US courts forbid third parties to tap or monitor oral telephone communications,[41] they routinely 
permit data packets[42] to be tracked, stored, and sold by third parties with the implied[43] or explicit[44] consent of 
either party engaged in the transmission. In the digital age, however, the law-made distinction between voice and 
data has become unclear. With the convergence of oral and data communications into a single transmission medium, 
the courts are unable to distinguish between oral telephone and electronic communications.[45] The use of VoIP and 
other broadband communication technologies has made this legal distinction impossible to uphold because oral 
telephone and electronic data communications now travel over the same wires simultaneously, encapsulated in 
digital data packets.[46] 
VoIP is a technology for transmitting ordinary telephone calls over the Internet. VoIP can send oral, fax and 
other information over the Internet, rather than through the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) or regular 
telephone network. For example, if you are connected to the Internet, you can simultaneously exchange data, audio 
or video with anyone while using VoIP.[47] The convergence of separate mediums shifts the legal landscape of digital 
communications and requires further examination. This examination must proceed in light of the disparity in judicial 
treatment between oral telephone and electronic data communications, with oral telephone communications generally 
receiving a higher level of privacy protection.[48]
VoIP is no longer a fledgling technology; it is rapidly becoming a mainstream communication product 
along with several other broadband communication technologies. Both corporate and individual consumers are using 
VoIP to reduce communication costs by capitalizing on their existing connections to Internet broadband 
infrastructure.[49] 
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the same medium,[51] thereby eliminating the need for multiple phone and data lines in a home[52] or business. 
While the market’s invisible hand has already fostered technical innovations making some VoIP services 
superior to those offered by the traditional PSTN,[53] the legislature and the courts have yet to resolve two primary 
legal issues that are likely to hinder the United States’ adoption of VoIP as the new oral communication standard. 
First, VoIP will have to contend with the extension of Congressional legislation from the PSTN to VoIP carriers to 
tax the transmission of data[54] and to regulate communication networks and line monopolies.[55] Second, the degree 
of privacy, if any, the law can provide to VoIP oral communications must be defined.[56] The taxation issue lies 
entirely in the hands of a legislature that is actively attempting to extend PSTN taxation to IP communications 
networks.
VoIP and other broadband communication technologies opens a paradigm of oral privacy, which will place 
a considerable strain on the existing judicial canons protecting oral and data communications. This legal privacy 
dichotomy poses a substantial risk that parties legitimately monitoring Internet data streams will unlawfully monitor 
constitutionally protected private oral communications.
Under the current legal framework, unauthorized third-party access to oral telephone communications made 
from the privacy of one’s home constitutes an invasion of any non-consenting person’s privacy. Courts will probably 
extend these privacy rights to VoIP communications because the Supreme Court has recognized oral communication 
privacy rights within the context of the home.[57] Because it is physically transmitted in the form of digital data 
packets over the Internet, VoIP oral communications, though essentially indistinguishable from Internet data 
communications, are legally protected by a constitutional right of privacy preventing third parties from tracking, 
tapping, storing or selling said communications.[58] 
If broadband companies triumph and a tiered Internet arises, these telecommunication/broadband companies 
will in varying degrees monitor and intercept digital packets. This act provides the consumer with a right to bring 
suit against the US government, the telecommunication provider, and any other parties for violating the federal 
Wiretap Act and a range of State specific laws. 
4.3. Oral Communications Delivered Over Municipal Broadband & Broadband Power Line 
Companies
Again, if the legal points above are resolved for entities that provide private broadband Internet services, the issue of 
State-funded municipal broadband ISPs (MISPs) remains unanswered. In this case, since the state is the broadband 
provider, there are greater duties lying upon the state to protect its citizens’ right to privacy and provide its citizens 
with unfettered access to information, as set-forth under the US constitution and in some instances at the state-level. 
Arguably, a MISP, which does not enforce the precepts of network neutrality, regardless of whether it violates Federal 
and States’ privacy rights, exposes itself to legal suit. 
States that explicitly recognize a citizen’s right to privacy (e.g. California)[59] require any MISP within that 
State to enforce the precepts of network neutrality. The reason for this derives from the fact that such ISPs cannot 
monitor a citizen’s Internet usage without cause due to state laws. Since the broadband provider is incapable of 
monitoring a client’s access, they cannot charge website providers, such as Google, as they cannot prove that said 
user had accessed Google via their network infrastructure. As long as Google does not share this information with 
the MISP, the above scenario is preserved. Thus, MISPs rend the ability to tier access impossible, resulting in de 
facto network neutrality.[60]
At this point, it is foreseeable that the electorate compels local municipalities to offer broadband service 
with unfettered access to the Internet and privacy protection. An alternative solution is to pass national legislation 
that requires broadband providers to implement the precepts of NN if they receive either (1) tax incentives for 
broadband infrastructure or (2) funds to create broadband infrastructure. This approach allows broadband companies 
to charge US citizens and service providers as long as their infrastructures do not receive taxpayer income. This 
thereby alleviates the significant imbalance created by using state funds to create broadband networks, which then do 
not provide equitable access to application services over the broadband infrastructure. 
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The US Federal government’s failure to legislate the Internet to ensure that the Internet does not become a tiered 
solution and to follow the precepts of network neutrality may all have significant international repercussions.[61] This 
is because embassies, consulates and other diplomatic missions operating in the US must purchase ISP services 
locally both for governmental purposes as well as personal use by those residing on the diplomatic premises. In order 
to implement domestic regulations and achieve network preference, these ISP must monitor the information 
transmitted to and from these embassies and consulates. This monitoring of the content and applications by the ISPs 
providing broadband service to embassies in the US violates the legal rights of the embassies to maintain confidential 
potentially sensitive information, and consequently may compromise the national security of these countries of any 
and all decisions made within US borders.
Generally, foreign embassies and consulates on US soil enjoy special status and are immune under US law 
from attachment or execution. Despite this qualified immunity, section 463 of the Restatement states that “The 
premises…of a state’s accredited diplomatic mission or consular post in the territory of another state are inviolable, 
and are immune from any exercise of jurisdiction by the receiving state that would interfere with their official use.” 
Inviolability imposes a distinct obligation on the receiving state to protect diplomatic premises from private 
interference. In compliance with these requirements, the District of Columbia and the US federal government have 
enacted statutes curtailing permissible activity within 500 feet of diplomatic premises if the sign brings the 
embassy’s government into “public odium” or “public disrepute.” 
The concept of inviolability elucidated by the Vienna Conventions should also apply to the manner in which 
private information service providers can transact with these foreign governments, specifically with regards to their 
capability of monitoring the information transmitted to and from these diplomatic missions.[62] This monitorization is 
a clear example of private interference with diplomatic property, as any and all communications between diplomats 
and their own nation are private and confidential, and should be protected by the inviolability concept espoused by 
the Vienna Conventions.[63]
However, as discussed above with recent Supreme Court decisions, information service carriers providing 
broadband Internet services are not constrained by the requirements imposed on telecommunications service 
providers. As a consequence, the lack of a cognizable regulatory framework for these private companies can result in 
the infringement of the privacy rights of these foreign governments. In the absence of network neutrality, it is possible 
that these information service providers can monitor the content of the communications entering and exiting the 
walls of these diplomatic missions, thereby violating the central precepts of the Vienna Conventions.
5. Recommendations
Even at a regulatory level (European and the US), we have seen a divergence of views on the need for network 
neutrality. Below are some preliminary recommendations that deal with network neutrality at an industry level without 
going through the legislative route.
5.1. Market Solutions for Cable Providers Compel Broadband Companies to implement Network 
Neutrality
One solution is for application providers in the United States and abroad to coalesce together and decide to restrict 
their content from broadband companies unless the companies follow a set of principles and contractually obligate 
themselves to a technological solution driven by the precepts of network neutrality. 
Secondly, two US providers[64] are releasing “broadband over power line” services in Dallas, Texas. If more 
network providers follow suit, there would be less inclination by them to block services such as Web TV, YouTube 
and VoIP calls.
Thirdly, another plausible solution which should be considered by the FCC in the US is the need to 
encourage more competition between network operators as in Europe so that consumers have a choice to switch from 
one network operator to another. This could be enhanced by a network competitor offering to ease the migration 
process for the consumer. Furthermore, there should be more than one network operator offering to provide 
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investigate whether the network operator was abusing its monopoly position (as in Europe). 
6. Conclusion
Currently, the European legal framework (in particular, the Access and Interconnection Directive) provides a robust 
structure to deal with access tiering between network and application service providers. Whilst the possibility of 
access tiering may occur between network and application providers, the current EU framework is sufficient to deal 
with this without the need for further regulations. 
The current state of the US law is in a state of flux and the broadband debate is certain to continue in the 
future. The US Congress will need to act to ensure network neutrality to address the main legal questions: US citizens’ 
constitutional right to privacy, a fragmented Internet due to state-based network neutrality legislation, US citizens’ 
right to access federal or state information, and regulatory issues specific to broadband power line technology. 
Two strong policy arguments further support the adoption of the network neutrality principles. The first 
policy argument draws from the following:
If a device performs the same technical function as a telephone, then those analogous communications 
should receive the same regulatory and legal protections treatment as a telephone. 
While the technology medium to transport the communication is new, the communication itself is unchanged. 
Therefore, the laws and statutes governing the oral communication themselves, not the medium, must still apply. 
The second policy argument focuses on the fact that the US prohibits both the government and companies 
from monitoring communications in order to dictate how and who individuals can communicate. Specifically, failure 
by the government to ensure the neutrality of these networks will allow broadband companies to act both as ISPs and 
as content creators. Furthermore, these companies will have a financial interest in prioritizing their own content and 
in threatening an individual’s right to privacy. Overall, the solution to the problem in the US is likely to require 
legislation at the Federal level until there is foreseeable potential for a fractured Internet.
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